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LAND TRUSTS:
SOME PROBLEMS IN VIRGINIA
Land trusts of the type commonly found in Illinois are unique and
somewhat controversial creatures. As creations of the legal imagination,
they embody many standard principles,' the combination of which
raises questions and difficulties unheard of in more normal circum-
stances. The essence of the device is a conveyance of subject real
property to a trustee, vesting the trustee by a recorded deed in trust
with all the powers of tide over the property, but in an unrecorded trust
agreement limiting the trustee's seemingly plenary powers to the point
where the actual control of the land is vested in the trust beneficiaries.
The result is a device for holding land which, when local law is benign,
has some extremely advantageous characteristics.
How the Illinois Land Trust got its start is not really clear. It
appears that the device was already popular when the first case mention-
ing it by name came to court.2 In all of the early cases3 there is no exam-
ination of the law upon which the device operates nor a questioning of
the basic principles which afford it its unique characteristics. The opin-
ions consist mainly of an examination of the trust agreement itself and
faithful acceptance of its operative terms. Such bland judicial approval
aided greatly in the establishment of the device in Illinois, and not until
recent attempts in introducing the land trust into other jurisdictions4
were made, were the principles upon which it is based seriously ex-
amined.5
The device is based on several common law principles. The statute
of uses raises a problem because of the vesting of no more than minis-
terial duties in the trustee, thereby possibly rendering the trust in-
volved capable of being classed as a dry or passive trust, subject to exe-
1. Garrett, LAND TRusts (reprint from IluNois LAW FORUM, Winter, 1955 pp. 655-
680) second revision, 1963 at p. 3.
2. Kerr v. Kotz, 218 IMI. App. 654 (1920) (abst. dec.)
3. Ibid.; Whitaker v. Scherer, 313 M. 473, 145 N.E. 177 (1924). The court in Whitaker
makes no mention or intimation of the land trust being a new device. The Illinois
Supreme Court, in Chicago Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Cacciatore, 25 III.
2d 538, 185 N.E.2d 670 (1962), mentioned that the device had been in use in Illinois
for eighty years.
4. Virginia and Florida. See: McKilop, The Illinois Land Trust in Florida, 13 FIA.
L. REv. 173.
5. See: Resnick v. Goldman, 133 So.2d 770 (1961), where the District Court of Appeals
of the Third District of Florida held that tender of the deed from the trustee without
submission of the trust agreement was not tender of marketable title when the land
was held under a land trust agreement.
[ 368]
LAND TRUSTS
cution by a strict application of the statute. The heart of the land
trust, however, lies in the operation of the doctrine of equitable con-
version, and it is here that the most serious questions arise concerning
the features which most vitally affect its usefuilness. The application
of the doctrine must be left to the courts, and until decisions are
forthcoming, much of the commentary on the point, other than in
Illinois, must be speculative.
Other questions arising in consideration of the land trust are the use of
incorporation by reference in relating the unrecorded trust agreement
with the recorded deed in trust to the trustee, and questions of public
policy which might arise in connection with consideration of this by the
courts.
Why then, should land trusts, with all their possible legal problems,
be worth all the trouble which has been put forth in attempting to
introduce them to states other than Illinois? The answer is that, if
successful, they have certain very desirable features which make them
quite useful in allowing large groups to own and deal with land as an
entity. The vehicle of a land trust enables one signature (that of the
trustee) to convey title to the property even though the beneficial
owners are scattered all over the country. If the law of the state is
benign toward the device, as it is in Illinois, and equitable conversion
considerations are correctly in line, chaos in the personal financial
affairs of the beneficiaries, such as death, bankruptcy and judgments
against them cannot encumber the title of the land in trust. Also, if
a corporate trustee is used, there is generally no problem with judg-
ments against it. Under such conditions the title to the property re-
mains freely alienable. Privacy of ownership provided by a land trust
is also often a convenient feature, allowing many parcels of land in the
same area to be bought without revelation of a common buyer and a
consequent possibility of a rise in price on the part of an informed land-
owner. Then, too, the beneficiaries might want to have the trustee deal
with unruly tenants without involvement.
The land trust also offers the highly desirable feature of limited liabil-
ity to the beneficiaries. In Illinois, at least, the purchase of land to be
held in trust may be accomplished on mortgage loans for which the
sole security is the land, with no personal liability required on the part
of the lender. In addition, it is also possible for a beneficiary holding a
certificate of interest in a land trust, to pledge the certificate as collateral
for a personal loan (upon notification of the trustee) without disturbing
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tide to the land.0 In such circumstances, the trust agreements generally
provide that such a pledgee, while he may receive the rents, profits and
other avails from the property does not receive the right to manage or
command its sale.7 The problem of deaths of out-of-state owners is
also simplified under the land trust, since, because their interests are
considered personalty, there is no necessity for troublesome double
probate proceedings and, as in any trust, devolution of beneficial interest
may be specified in the agreement. In addition, the land trust device
also necessitates the presence of a responsible local representative in the
person of the trustee.8
Many of the foregoing characteristics, of course, are not peculiar to
the land trust. Nor are they all of the possibilities which might be ex-
ploited should imaginative legal minds turn their efforts to the task.
Something must be said for their simplicity and ease of establishment,
however, and there is little question but they would be a desirable al-
ternative to have available.
THE STATUTE OF USES
The first problem which arises in the technical considerations of the
applicability of the local law on the possibility of the use of land trusts
deals with the operation of the statute of uses. If the ministerial duties
given the trusteeP are not considered by the local courts to be sufficient
under that jurisdiction's statute of uses to keep the trust from being a
dry or passive one the trust is executed and, with equitable tide of the
land thereby vested in the beneficiaries, the land trust is destroyed. In
Virginia, the problem was not considered a particularly serious one
even before legislation was passed,1 but now, with the advent of a
6. Homey v. Hayes, 11 11. 2d 178, 142 N.E. 2d 94 (1957); Seno v. Frank, 169 N.E.2d
335 (1961); Duncanson v. Lill, 322 IM. 528, 153 N.E. 618 (1962).
7. Seno v. Frank, supra, note 6.
8. Garrett, Land Trusts, supra, note 1; LAND TRUSTS: A Naw CONCEPT FOR HOLDING
LAND IN ViRGniA, published by the Central National Bank of Richmond, Virginia
(1962).
9. Duties such as conveying the land on the order of the beneficiaries, and selling
the corpus at the end of the twenty-year period are normal provisions in land trust
agreements.
10. Section 55-17 of the 1950 CODE OF VmGINu (repl. vol. 1959). See: Blake v. O'NeAl,
63 W.Va. 583, 61 S.E. 410 (1908), where a copy of the Virginia Statute of Uses was
closely examined and found to apply only to three situations: deeds of bargain and
sale, deeds of lease and re-lease, and covenants to stand seized for the use of another, at
p. 413.
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new Virginia statute," the problem of the statute of uses has been laid
to rest.
It was generally considered that the Virginia Statute of Uses' did not
apply to instruments by which real property was conveyed by a settlor
to a trustee, since the Statute seems to apply mainly to a situation in
which a property owner declares himself trustee for another in passive
trust.? But there was some worry that a Virginia court, under its
general equity power,14 might declare the property to be vested in the
beneficiaries under a deed of trust. The Virginia court made such a
declaration, however, under a situation in which the trustee had no
duties at all, whereas under the terms of a land trust the trustee, in
addition to certain current ministerial duties, is also required to sell the
land at the end of twenty years.
When the Illinois Supreme Court was faced with interpretation of
this problem,'5 it held that the duties imposed on the trustee of having
the real property subdivided and platted, and the powers given it to
control, improve, use, sell, lease and mortgage the land made the trust
active and, therefore, not executed by the Illinois Statute of Uses.
11. Section 55-17.1 of the 1950 CODE oF VIRGINIAu, passed by the General Assembly
April 16, 1962, which reads as follows:
§ 55-17.1. No trust relating to real estate shall fail, nor shall any use relating
to real property be defeated because no beneficiaries are specified by name in
the recorded deed of conveyance to the trustee or because no duties are imposed
upon the trustee. The power conferred by any such instrument on a trustee to
sell, lease, encumber or otherwise dispose of property therein described shall be
effective and no person dealing with such a trustee shall be required to make
further inquiry as to the right of such trustee to act nor shall he be required to
inquire as to the disposition of any proceeds.
Nothing in this section shall be construed (1) to affect any right which a
creditor may otherwise have against a trustee or beneficiary, (2) to enlarge upon
the power of a corporation to act as Trustee under S 6-9 or (3) affect the rule
against perpetuities.
12. Supra, note 10.
13. Ibid.
14. Sims v. Sims, 94 Va. 580, 27 S.E. 436 (1897), where a will leaving one-third of the
testator's estate in trust for his incompetent son for life, with no terms for directions
for administration, was held by the court to be executed as a passive trust, and the
son's committee entitled to possession of the property. See also: Jones v. Tatum, 19
Gratt. (60 Va.) 720 (1870), where the court held that the sole duty of the trustee to
convey land to the children kept the trust from being a dry or passive one. (citing
Bass v. Scot-, 2 Leigh (29 Va.) 356 (1830)).
15. Hart v. Seymour, 35 N.E. 246 (1893). Although the property in this case was
not held under a land trust, the proposition was never seriously questioned in cases
actually involving them. See also: Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust and
Savings Bank, 300 Ill. App. 329, 20 N.E.2d 992, (1939).
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THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION
The very heart of the trust lies in the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion, for it is upon this principle that the beneficiaries' interests are
made personalty, removing them from the application of dower and
curtesy, allowing the possibility of avoidance of double probate pro-
ceedings, making them unable to encumber title to the land with their
personal debts and prescribing the devolution of the beneficiaries'
interest upon his death.
Professor Bogert states:
while the right of (sic) cestui que trust was originally in personam
against the trustee, it has become increasingly a right in rem and is
now substantially equivalent to equitable ownership in the trust res.'6
In view of this statement, if the corpus of the trust should be realty,
the beneficiary has a real property interest which is subject to the rules
governing such property. However, as a matter of intention rather
than law, a deed to one person for the use of another may separate the
legal from the equitable title and vest the former in the trustee and the
latter in the the cestui que trust, dictating that each descend accord-
ingly.'7 If, then, the interests of the trustee and the beneficiary are
subject to the will of the settlor, it is possible that the expression of such
intent may be sufficient to vest the desired tide in each party. In
addition to and further substantiating this view, the Illinois Supreme
Court' quoted with approval from Powell's The Law of Real Property,
as follows:
Interests of beneficiaries of private express trusts run the gamut from
valuable substantialities to evanescent hopes. Such a beneficiary may
have any one of almost infinite variety of the possible aggregate of
rights, privileges, powers and immunities.19
Note that this is an expression of trust law, not the operation of equi-
table conversion. In Gordon v. Gordon2 the Supreme Court of Illinois
found that the interest of a beneficiary of a trust, the corpus of which
was land, was an interest in real property. It held that the nature of the
16. BoeERr, TRUSTS, sec. 37 at p. 162 (3rd. ed, 1952).
17. Blake v. O'Neal, supra, note 10; Grove v. Long, 89 W. Va. 652, 109 S.E. 817.
18. See: Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E. 2d 697 (1955), also Garrett, supra,
note 1 at p. 5.
19. 4 Pow., REAL PROPERTY 87 (1952), also Garrett, supra, note 1 at p. 5.
20. 6 MU. 2d 572, 129 N.E. 2d 706 (1955).
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interest depended on the trust agreement, and in the absence of a pro-
vision to the contrary, the general rule that the beneficiary is the equi-
table owner of the trust corpus applied. The Court went on to state that
the doctrine of equitable conversion is an exception to the general rule,
but found that the doctrine did not apply in that case. There is no way
of knowing from a reading of the case whether or not the trust was an
ordinary land trust, but the holding would seem to indicate
that it should be specified in each land trust agreement that the
interest of the beneficiaries in the trust is to be personal property." It
is possible that the manner in which the Illinois Court disposed of the
equitable conversion issue would not bar its argument in later cases,
and that equitable conversion alone, without an expressed provision in
the trust agreement, might be capable of converting the interests of the
beneficiaries of a land trust into personalty. There is ample authority
for this proposition in other jurisdictions:
"Equitable conversion" is that change in the nature of property by
which for certain purposes real estate is considered as personalty or
personal estate as real and transmissible and descendable as such...oM
In a land trust, the transfer of land by the settlor to the beneficiary
with directions to sell, even though the directions state that the sale is
not to be made for twenty years, transfers the interest of the beneficiary
of the trust into personalty immediately by equitable conversion. Pro-
fessor Scott states:
The cases are numerous in which it is held that a mandatory direction
to trustees to sell land which they hold in trust causes an equitable con-
version. And that the interest of the beneficiaries is to be treated not
as real estate but as personal property, even though the trustees have
not yet sold the land2
21. Garrett, supra, note 1 at p. 9.
22. Richardson v. McCloskey, 261 S.W. 801, 812 (Tex. 1924); In Re Dodge's Estate, 223
N.W. 106 (Iowa 1929).
23. 2 Scor, TRUSTS sec. 31 at pp. 976-77 (2d ed, 1956). Cited as authority there is
Duncanson v. Lill, 322 IMl. 528, 153 N.E. 618 (1926), an Illinois trust case where
appeal by beneficiaries was denied by the Illinois Supreme Court on the basis that a
freehold interest was not held by them. See also: BoGEr, TRUSTS sec. 37 at p. 163 (2d ed.,
1952); Johnson v. Tracey, 326 Mass. 628, 96 N.E. 2d 157 (1951); Sweesy v. Hoy, 324
11. 319, 155 N.E. 323 (1927); Chicago, North Shore and Milwaukee RR. Co. v. Chicago
Title and Trust Co. 328 Mll. 610, 160 N.E. 226 (1928); Knight v. Gregory, 333 I1. 643,
165 N.E. 208 (1928); Goben v. Johnson, 335 I1. 395, 167 N.E. 94 (1929); Ahrens v.
Ahrens, 345 111. 269, 178 N.E. 104 (1931); Aronson v. Olson 348 IM1. 26, 180 N.E. 104
(1931); Union Guardian Trust Company v. Nichols, 311 Mich. 107, 18 N.W.2d 383
(1945).
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and further:
There is equitable conversion where the trustee is directed to sell the
land, even though it is not his duty to sell it immediately. It is
sufficient that there is imposed upon him by the trust instrument an
absolute duty to sell at some time.24
The doctrine of equitable conversion is recognized in Virginia,2 and
the Supreme Court of Appeals has held that real property conveyed to
a trustee with directions that the property should be sold without quali-
fication is immediately transformed into personalty.28
Doubts have been interposed concerning the possibilities of a differ-
ent conclusion based on the requirement that a land trust agreement gives
the trustee no discretion to sell the property during the initial twenty-
year period except pursuant to the order of the beneficiaries.27 The
general rule is that if the land is transferred to the trustee to be sold
contingent on an event which might not happen, then equitable con-
version does not take place until the event happens, but if the order is
not contingent, then the conversion takes place immediately.28 The
24. 2 ScoTr, Taus-s, sec. 131 at p. 977 (2d ed, 1956); Chicago Title and Trust Co. v.
Mercantile Trust and Savings Bank, supra, note 15; Liberty National Bank of Chicago
v. Kosterlitz, 329 IIl. App. 244, 67 N.E.2d 876 (1946).
25. See: Clay v. Landreth, 187 Va. 169, 45 S.E.2d 875 (1948).
26. McClanachan v. Siter, Price and Co, 2 Gratt. (43 Va.) 280 (1845). In that case,
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that a deed to trustee specifying that
land which was the corpus of the trust be sold for the benefit of the grantors immediate-
ly converted the interest of the grantors to personalty by equitable conversion, and as
such the remainder interest went to the husband on the death of the wife. The Court
said at pp. 294-95: "It is well settled that land directed or agreed to be sold and turned
into money, (upon the principle that what is agreed or ought to be done is considered
as done) shall be treated as immediately assuming the quality of personalty, and as
continuing impressed with that character, until some person entitled to the pro-
ceedings shall elect to take the subject in its original character as land." (Although the
last words in the quotation might be at first thought to raise doubt seemingly laid to
rest, it should be remembered that all land trust agreements specifically negate the
capability of the beneficiaries to claim interest in the land itself, and Illinois courts,
at least, have been religious in giving strict effect to the terms of the trust agreement.)
See: Hart v. Seymour, 35 N.E. 246 (Ill. 1893); Whitaker v. Scherer, 313 Ill. 473, 145
N.E. 177 (1924); Martin v. Martin, 170 Ill. 634; Chicago, N. S. & M. R. R. Co. v. Chicago
Title and Trust Co, 328 Ill. 610, 160 N.E. 226 (1928).
27. See: Scorr, supra note 24 and quoted material in the body of text. See also: Mellon
v. Reed, 123 Pa.St. 1, 15 At. 906 (1888); also: 124 A.L.R. 448 (1940). In the Mellon case
it was held that when the sale of land was not capable of being defeated by a personal
representative, but only delayed during her lifetime, that the order to sell was absolute,
and equitable conversion of the beneficiary's interest took place immediately.
28. Harcurn's Adm'r v. Hudnall, 14 Gratt. (55 Va.) 369 (1858).
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Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however, has declared by way of
dicta that equitable conversion might not take place until the happening
of a contingent event though the direction to sell the land at some time
was absolute.2
The real area of doubt, however, appears to be that in all cases other
than those concerning land trusts decided in Illinois, ° the operation of
equitable conversion is an incidental rather than a preplanned and relied-
upon effect. On this basis, it may well be that a misguided court, rely-
ing on considerations of public policy, could fail to give the desired
effect to the doctrine.31 Despite this possibility, it would seem that a
court would be hard pressed to defeat both the argument that the nature
of the beneficiaries' interest is explicitly stated in the trust agreement,
and that the doctrine of equitable conversion applies.
TORT Linmrry FoR ACCIDENTS ON THE PROPERTY
The general rule in situations where land is held under a trust is
that liability for torts occurring on the property falls upon the trustee if
the rights of control and possession are vested in it.8 If, on the other
hand, the trustee does not have the right to possession and control, he
has been held not liable for such torts.3s Such a rule has been applied
to a land trust in Illinois, and, although a Virginia case holds that a
trustee with right to possession and control of the property is liable, 4
this is not contradictory to similar statements in Illinois,'* so it is probable
that the general rule would be applied in Virginia.
RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE BENEFICIARIES
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has held that the
beneficiaries of a business trust were liable as partners in a tort arising
from the negligent operation of the trust property on the ground that
they formed an association of shareholders and retained the right to
29. Harcum, supra, note 28, might be distinguishable from the typical land trust case
in the ground that in that case there was an absolute prohibition against the sale of the
land until the contingent event, where in a land trust there is not, but rather a
prohibition to sell except at the direction of the beneficiaries.
30. See: Gordon v. Gordon, 6 M1. 2d 572, 129 N.E.2d 706 (1955).
31. See: Carr v. Branch, 85 Va. 597 (1889).
32. Butler v. Townsend, 31 N.Y.S. 1094 (Sup. Ct. 1895); Pena v. Stewart, 78 Arii. 272,
278 P.2d 892 (1955); Richman v. Green, 143 Cal. App. 2d 470, 99 P2d 890 (1956).
33. Richman v. Green, supra, note 32.
34. Belvin's Ex'rs v. French, 84 Va. 81 (1887).
35. Brazowski v. Chicago Tide and Trust Co, 280 IMI. App. 293 (1935); Whitaker v
Central Trust Co, 270 M1. App. 614 (abst. dec. 1933).
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conduct a business.36 Since the retention by the beneficiaries of the
right to control the property in a land trust is similar to a Massachusetts
trust, the statement made in a general manner by various courts that
have likened the Massachusetts trust beneficiaries in some respects to
partners may apply to land trust beneficiaries. In the well known case
of State Street Trust Co. v. Hall,3" however, the court held that the
terms of the Uniform Partnership Act did not apply to a Massachusetts
trust because "it makes no mention of a partnership with transferable
shares." 38
A recent Illinois case 9 held that a court, upon finding a deadlock
between two factions of beneficiaries, could declare a termination of
the business arrangement and sale of the corpus property under its
general equity power. The court refused, however, to decree the sale
under the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act. After stating
that in other types of business arrangements (such as joint adventures
and corporations) courts had been called upon to decree dissolution,
the court stated:
In the Uniform Partnership Act many grounds are provided on which
dissolution may be obtained, and an Illinois Court has decreed dis-
solution of a partnership where such embittered relations existed be-
tween partners as to render it impracticable for them to conduct the
business beneficially (citations omitted).
Thus, for a wide variety of forms of business, courts have been
empowered to decree dissolution where disagreement producing
stalemate defeated the very objects of the business arrangement. We
believe that the principle should be extended to a termination of the
business arrangement in the instant case.40
It declared the partnership analogy imperfect in that in a land trust, the
beneficiary can get out of the arrangement by selling his interest freely,
with the buyer being entitled to all his rights,41 while a partner cannot
transfer his status, even though he may sell his interest in the partner-
ship assets with the approval of the other partners.
The case carries many important implications beyond the aspect of
the relationship of the beneficiaries. Not the least of these is the fact that
the court, after thoroughly examining the issue,42 allowed the dissenting
36. Marchulonis v. Adams, 97 W. Va. 517, 125 S.E. 340 (1924).
37. 311 Mass. 299,41 NZ.2d 30 (1942).
38. Id., 41 N.E.2d at 37.
39. Regas v. Danigeles, 54 11. App. 2d 271, 213 N.E.2d 730 (1964).
40. Id., 203 N.E.2d 734 at 735.
41. Ibid. (court's footnote 7.).
42. Supra, note 40.
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beneficiaries to do indirectly what they could not do directly, that is,
achieve sale and thereby a partition of the corpus property. Prior to this
case it had been the settled rule in Illinois that since the interest of
land trust beneficiaries is personalty and not realty, they have no right of
partition in the property itself.48 The decision noted that the purpose of
the rule was to prevent a beneficiary having only a small fraction of the
interest from compelling partition, and stated that since here each fac-
tion owned fifty percent of the interest the possibility of partition would
work no hardship, and could therefore be decreed. Even with this
expressed qualification, it is impossible to tell how the holding affects
the possibilities of partition being achieved by dissenting beneficiaries
under other facts.
Since the duties and powers of the trustees and beneficiaries are ex-
pressed fully in the trust agreement, it is doubtful that a court would
apply the terms of the Uniform Partnership Act in such a way as to
adversely affect them.
AGENcY BETwEEN TRUSTEE AND BElIcLARinmS
In considering the land trust concepts attention must be paid to its
internal administration. There are apparently no cases concerning mis-
conduct of a trustee with respect to the beneficiaries, but there is no
reason why such might not become a problem from time to time should
the land trust be put into wide use. For instance, what happens if the
trustee sells part of the property on his own, or refuses to carry out
a sale ordered by the beneficiaries? The use of a responsible corporate
trustee would tend to minimize these problems, and a writ of mandamus
or action for money would most likely be successful against a trustee
who misconducts himself, but how is the tide passing from the trustee
to the unwary buyer affected?
This subject has been dealt with at some length44 concerning the
possibilities of the trustee being considered an agent for the beneficiaries
and vice versa-reaching the conclusion that the question of agency de-
pends on the trust agreement and facts involved, and not necessarily on
the provisions of the land trust itself. 45 However, the problem of the
43. Whitaker v. Scherer, 313 IlL. 473, 145 NE. 177 (1924); Aronson v. Olson, 348 E11.
26, 180 N.E. 104 (1931).
44. Garrett, supra, note 1, at pp.12, 13, 14, and 15.
45. See: Gallagher and Speck v. Chicago Tide and Trust Co, 238 IL App. 39 (1929);
Brazowski v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 280 II. App. 293 (1935); Schneider v.
Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank, 26 111. App. 463, 168 N.E.2d 808 (1960); Barkhausen v.
Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co, 3 Ill.2d 254, 120 NE.2d 649 (1954);
Robinson v. Chicago National Bank, 32 Ill. App.2d 55, 176 NE.2d 659 (1961); ScotT,
Tausrs sec. 274 (1st ed, 1939); 2 Scorr, TRusrs sec. 225 at p. 1643 (2d ed, 1956).
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nature of the title taken by the purchaser without knowledge of the
lack of authority on the part of the trustee is important also. The Vir-
ginia enabling act states that the buyer is not required to make inquiry
into the authority of the trustee to sell the property, and therefore,
clearly implies that the buyer would get good title, leaving the bene-
ficiary with only a damage suit against the trustee. Otherwise, thE
buyer would be foolish to purchase property without a look at the trust
instrument and an inquiry in to the specific authority of the trustee.
THE ARGUMENT AGAINST LEGALITY
The problems surrounding the effect of the statute of uses have for the
most part been resolved both by case law and by statute, but several
other considerations have not met with the same fortunate fate. The
extent and nature of the incorporation of the unrecorded trust agree-
ment by reference made to it in the recorded deed of trust may still be
questioned. The problem has resolved itself into whether or not a
court would tend to give effect to the powers of the trustee and interest
of the beneficiaries as they are specified in the recorded instrument with-
out allowing the purchasers a look at the trust agreement. Although a
Florida case47 has held that title to land held under a land trust is un-
marketable without accompanying tender of the trust agreement, the
Virginia enabling act48 appears to have offered sufficient solution by its
provision that the buyer need not inquire into the powers of the trustee
nor the application of the purchase money.
There is remaining a question of the nature of the beneficiary's
interest. The Virginia Courts have not yet been asked whether or not
the parties to a trust agreement can vary by their own acts rights which
vest by operation of law, or, more specifically, whether or not both legal
and equitable title can be vested in the trustee and whether the bene-
ficiaries do in fact obtain only that part of the bundle of rights which
the settlors wish them to have. Illinois courts have decided that the
beneficial interest in a land trust is personalty49 and not a freehold
estate in land, °0 that beneficiaries have a right only to the rents and in-
46. See note 11, supra.
47. See Resnick v. Goldman, 133 So.2d 770 (1961).
48. See note 11, supra.
49. Regas v. Danigeles, 54 Ill. App.2d 271, 213 N.E.2d 730 (1964), supra, note 39; Chi-
cago, N. S. & M. R. R. Co. v. Chicago Title and Trust Co, 328 Ill. 610, 160 N.E. 226
(1928); Chicago Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Cacciatore, 25 Ill.2d 535, 185
NE.2d 670 (1962).
50. Duncanson v. Lll, 322 Ill. 528, 153 N.E. 618 (1926); Sweesy v. Hoy, 324 I1. 319,
155 N.E. 323 (1927); Seno v. Frank, 169 NE.2d 335 (1961).
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come from the property,5' that they have neither legal nor equitable
title,62 that they have no right to partition of the trust property,' that
they may be allowed to direct the trustee in dealing with the property
without upsetting any of these principles,54 that in forming the trust
they may convey out or retain any part of the bundle of rights they
choose'5 and that any judgments against them personally do not attach
to the land. These issues in Virginia are yet to be decided, but previous
decisions do not appear to have erected any permanent obstructions.
The most serious hurdle in the path of full acceptance of the land
trust in Virginia as a full-blooded working entity was formulated, iron-
ically, by the very statuteF which removed many others. The state-
ment contained therein, that nothing in the statute should be construed
to affect the right of any creditor of the trustee or beneficiaries, may
have implications far beyond the effects contemplated by the legislators.
Such an indefinite statement may, if interpreted out of context, be twist-
ed to imply that, although other problems are not affected, the relation-
ships of creditors to trustees and beneficiaries with regard to land trusts
would have to be determined without the aid of the provisions of the
statute. Thus, with respect to the relationship of these parties, the statute
of uses would have to be interpreted by case law, and the new code sec-
tion would have no effect on the problem. It is difficult to see how
this might happen, but court decisions or a revision of the statute ap-
pears to be the only practical remedy to possible doubts.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing discussions, one may see that most of the obstacles
encountered in establishing the land trust in a new jurisdiction have been
negotiated. The remaining problems, though not theoretically large
when compared with those negotiated, still prevent the land trust from
51. Duncanson v. Lill, supra note 50.
52. Duncanson v. Lill, supra note 50; Aronson v. Olsen, 398 Ill. 26, 180 NE. 104 (1931);
Breen v. Breen, 411 IMI. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1957); Crawford Realty and Development
Corp. v. Woodlawn Trust and Savings Bank, 382 IMI. 354, 47 N.E.2d 81 (1943).
53. Whitaker v. Scherer, 313 IMI. 473, 145 NE. 177 (1924); Breen v. Breen, supra, note
52.
54. Chicago Tide and Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust and Savings Bank, 300 111. App.
329,20 N.E2d 992 (1939).
55. Schuman-Heink v. Folsom, 328 11. 321, 159 N.E. 250 (1927); Bellows v. Ziv, 187
NX.E2d 265 (1962).
56. Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust and Savings Bank, supra, note
54; Kerr v. Kotz, 218 1. App. 654 (1920).
57. See note 11, supra.
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taking its rightful place among devices which may be used for holding
land in Virginia.
The questions raised by the final provision of the Virginia enabling
act as mentioned above concerning the rights of creditors of benefi-
ciaries have dictated that title examiners adverse all beneficiaries of the
land trust for judgments and other liens against them. It may be easily
seen that checking outstanding liens against two, three, four or even ten
beneficiaries is the job required of tide examiners every day. Should a
land trust have fifty or a hundred beneficiaries, however, as well it
might should the device become widely accepted, it is not hard to see
why attorneys would just as soon use some other device, and tide insur-
ance companies bless them in their inclinations. It is also distressing to
note that the requirement that the beneficiaries be adversed also nullifies
one of the most attractive and controversial characteristics of the land
trust, that is, the equitable conversion of the interests of the beneficiaries
to personalty, so that judgments against them cannot become clouds on
tide to the land. Again, the only solution to the problem appears to lie in
the courts.
William C. Cowardin, Jr.
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